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A N
i.y^/j
ESS AY
C O^N€ E R N I N
Humane Understanding.
JOHN LOCKE, Gent.
VOLUME II.
^§IJL*&*
LONDON: Printed in the Year M D C C X.
L^^-: •.'
'••**»Vt»X
■i
THE
€'ON:TENT S.
BOOK MI.
Of w
O R D S.
CHAP. I. OfPf^ordt and Lattguage in gc
neral. 1. of the Signification ofiVords. J. of getie^-al Terms, 4, Of the Nj??. es of fimple Ideas. f. of the Names of mixed Modei and Relations.
CHAP.
6. of the hfames of Suhftancef^
7. of ahflrafi and concrete Termu
8. OfthelmperfeBionofWords. g. Of the Abufe of IVords,
10. Of the Remedies of the forego^ ing ImperfeSmns arid Abufei».
B O O K I V.
Of K N Q w L 4 D G E an4 Op I N I o n.
CHAP. 1 . 0/ Kneraledge in general, i. of the Degrees of our Knowledge.
3. of i he Extent of Humane Know- ledge,
4. Of the Reality of our Knowledge,
5. of Truth in general.
6. Ofuniverfal Propo/itions, their
Truth and Certainty.
7. of Maxims,
8. of tricing Propofiiions,
9. 0/ OHr Knowledge ofExiBenee. 19, Oftht Exifience of a. GOD. j^l. Of the Knawlsdgt oj the Exi-
p,encfi ofoihfr Things.
CHAP.
I z. of the Improvement of our KnevH" ledge, _ .^
I J. Some other Confider at ions' con* cerning our Knowledge, ■
14. Of Juagment.
IS Of Probability.
16. Of the Degrees of Affent. \
\ 7. Of Reafon.
18. 0/ Faith and Reafin., as con- tra diftingutfhed.,
ip. Of Enthufiafm.
xo. Of wrong AJfent, or Error.
21.. The Divifion of tk^Sciencts,
h
a a
THE
CONTENTS.
BOOK III.
CHAP. I.
'»' Of Words or Language in general,
SECT.
1 . Man fitted to form articH-
Uie Sounds. 1. To make them- Sigfit of /- deat, J, 4. To nittke general SfgH!.
5. Words uiriv^ately derived jrom fuch tu figntjy fen^-
ble Ideas.
6. Difirilution.
CHAP. II. Of the Signification of Words,
SECT.
I . Wards arefenfihle Signs ntf-
ct£'jrj for Communicmtion.
t, 3. Words are the fenf.ble Stgnt
of his Ideas V)ho ttjis them,
4., Words often ftcrttly refer- red. Firfi, to the Idsas in other Mens Minds.
J. Secondly, To the Reality of Things.
(. Words hy Vje readily extite Jdeas.
7, Words often ufed without Signification.
8. Their Signification per felf'
iy arbitrary.
CHAP. III. Of general Termt.
SECT.
1. The greateH part of Words general,
2, For every particular Thing to have a Name, u impoffible.
},4., And ujelefs.
y. What Things have proper Names. 6-%, Horn general Words sre made. $. General Natures are no- thing but ahpraH Ideas, le. Why rhe Genas is ordinarily ,
made Ufe of in Definitions'^. 1 1, General and univerjal are Creatures ej the Under* flandmg. J r. Ahftracf Ideas are the Ef- fences of the Genera and Species, J J. They are the Workman/hip of the Under ft andinf^, but have their Foundation m the Similitude ofThingt.
14..
The Contents.
14.. Eash dtjiinB ahjtraB Idt»,is adifiifiB EJfence,
15. Rtalani nominal Ejfence,
16. Ctnflant Connexion between the Name and Nominal Ej- fence.
1 7 . Suppo/itiont that Species are diflingai/hed by their real Effences, ufelejs.
\%. Real and nominal Ejfence, the fame in (imple Ideas and Modes , different in Sub- fiances,
19. Effences ingenerable and in- corruptihle,
10. Recapitulation.
CHAP. IV. of the Names of (imple Ideas.
-SECT.
I, Names of fitnple Ideas, M'des, and Sttbflancest have each fomething peculiar.
a. Firji, Names of Jlmple Ideas and Subjiances, intimate real Exijlence.
3. Secondly, Names of Jimplt Ideas and Modes, fgntfy al- ways both real and nominal Effence. 4. Thirdly, Names of Jlmple 1-
deas undeftnable. $, If all V ere definable, ^twould be a Procefs in infinitum.
6, What a Definition ts.
7. Simple Ideas, vfhy indefinable. t, j. Infiance Motion,
10. Light.
11. Simple Ideas why undefina-
ble, farther explained. It, 13. The contrary fj^ewed in com- plex Ideas by Inftances of a Statue and Rainbow. ^4. Tht Na;met ofeompUx I^eas,
when to be made intelligible
by Words. If, Fourthly y Names offimple /-
deas leafi doubtful. 16, Fifthly, Simple Ideas have
few yffcents in linea pr«di-
caniencaii 1^, Sixthly, Name: of /imple I-
deas Jland for Ideas not at
all arbitrary.
CHAP V.
of the Names of mixed Modes and Relations.
SECT.
I , They fidnd for abffraB /- deas, as other general Names.
2. Firjl, The Ideas they /land for, are made by the Under' fianding,
3 . Secondly, Made arbitrarily , and
without Patterns.
4. Uow this is done.
5. Evidently arbitrary, in thaf
the Idea is often before the Exijlence.
6. Injiances Murther , Incefi,
Stabbing.
7. But fliUfubfervient to the End
of Language.
8. Whereof the intranfiatable Words of divers Language^ are a Proof.
S. This Jhews species to be made for Communication, 10, II. In mixed Modes^ ''tis the Name that tits the Combi- nation together, and makes it a Spicies, 12. For the Originals of mixed Modes, we look no fan her than the Mind, wh>ch aljo (hews them to be the Work- manjhip of the Underjland- tf'S' A3 I J,
The Contents.
1 3. lijeir bein^ made by the Un- derJIaudtHg without Pat- teriii, P:ews the Reafen why they are fo compounded.
14. N/ttnti of mixed Modes jiavd always far their Real £/- Jemes.
1 5. Why their KamtS areiifual- ly got before their Ideas,
16. Re.i\on of my being fo large OH this SubjeEi.
C H'A P. VI.
of the Names of Snb Ranees.
SECT.
I . The common Names of Sub- fianees pand for forts^
i. The Ejfence ofeachjort, is
the abjfraff Idea. 3. The nominal and real Ef fence dijfei'CHt. ^ 6, Nothmg ejfential to Indivi- duals. ■;,Z, The nominal Ejfence bounds the Species. 5. Not the real Ejfence which we know not,' 10. Not luhjl ant ial Forms which
we know lefs,
1 I . Tiiat the n0min.1l Effence it
that whtreby we dijiingutfh
Species , farther evident
from spirits.
12. IVhii-eof there are probably
Mumberlefs Species. 1 3. T':e no7ninalEjfenct that of the Species , proved from Water and Ice. 1 4 -18. Dtjfculties againfl a cer- tain Number of real Ejfc7ices . 19. Our nominal Effence s of Sub- fiances, not perfeB Coiltcli- »ns of P>operttes.
II. But Jiich a CoUeSlionas tur N^?»e jiaudsfor.
iz, Our abflra^ Idra; are to m the Measures of SpeLia, In- Jlances in th.it of t4an. zj. Specie f not diHinguij/hed by
Generation. 24. Not by fubftantial Forms. 2j. The jpecifick Ejftmes art
made by the Mind, r6. Therefore veyy variota and
uncertain! 27. But not fo arbitrarily as
iftixed Modes, i8. Though very hn^erfeB, Z5>. Which yet ferves for totn-
mon Converfe.
30. But mak^s feveral Effencet
fignified by the fame Name*
- 3 t. The 7xore general our Ideas
'are , the more incofpleat
and partial they are.
53, This all accommodated t»
■ the End tf Speech. 3 3, Inftances in Caffnaries, 34. Men make the Species ^ in-
Jlance Gold. 3 S' Though Nature make the Si- militude. 16. And continues it in the
Races of Things. 37. Each aljiraB Idea is an Ef- fence. 38. Gtntrz and S^ic\c?, in order to naming, injlance Watch, 3P, Species of artificial Things, lefs confufedthan natural. . 40. Artificial Things ofdi^mB Species.
41. Subllances alone have pro- per Names.
42, Difficulty to treat of Words with Words.
43,44. Injlance of mixed Modes ijt
Kincah and Niouph, 4 J, 46. Injlance of Subji antes in Zahab. 47. Their Ideas perjt^^ and fherejort vanoHf*
48.
The Contents.
48. Therefore tof.x their Species,
a real Ejfence Ufuppofed.
49. Which Suppopion is of no Ufe,
50. Condajiort'
CHAP. VII.
0/ Particlet.
SECT.
I. PtirticUi conneB Parts, cr
whole Sentences together, z. In them conjifls the Art of
well Speaking. 3, 4. They /hew what Relation
the Mind gives to its own
Thoughts, 5. Inllance in Bur. «J. This Matter but lightly
touched here.
CHAP. VIII.
OfAhJlralf and Concrete Tirniu
SECT.
I. ^bllra5l Teytns mtpredica-
ble one of another, and why, a. They /hew the Difference of our Ideas.
CHAP. IX.
of the ImperfeSfion of Words,
SECT.
1 . Words are ufed for recor' ding and communicating our Thoughts,
2. Any Words will ferve for recording.
3. Communication by Words ^ Civil or Philejophical. S
4. The ImperfeBien of Words, is the Douhtfulncfs of their iigmfcatitn.
y, Caufes of thiir Imp'erjeBi-' on.
tf. The bJames of mixed Modes
doubtful. Firjiy Becauft the
Ideas they /land for, are fa
complex. *
y. Secondly, Becaufi they have
no Standards. 8. Propriety not a fufficient
Remedy. y, The way of learning theft
Names, contributes alfo ttt
their Doubtfuhiefs. 1 o. Hence unavoidable Obfcuri-
ty in ancient Authors. 1 2, Names ofSubflances referrd.
Firfi, to real Effences that
cannot be known, ii, 14.. Secondly , To co-ext fling
Slicalittes, which are hiowit
but imperfeBly.
15. With thtf JnjpeifeBton they may ferve far Civil, but not
well for Philofophical Ufe»
16. Inflance Liquor of Nerves,
17. Inflance Gold.
18. The Names of/impUldeJf^ the leaft doubtful.
ip. And next to them Jimple Modes.
ao. The mofl doubtful, are the Names of very compounded Mixed Modes and Subfiances,
2. 1 , Why this Imperfeciion char- ged upon Words. 12, 23. Tha/kould teach us Mode- ration, in impofing our own Senfeofold Authors.
CHAP. X.
Of the Abu fe of Words,
ECT.
I. Abitfe of Words. i,'5, Firfl, Words without 4ny, or without clear Idiat.,
A * A-
The Contents.
8. 9
10.
II. II.
14.
1<J. 17*
18.
ao.
21.
Zl.
13. 24.
Occ/ijioncd hy Itarning iJav.ci before the Ideas thty teltng to,
Seeondly, Unfltudy j^ppltca- tt$n of them.
Thirdly, y1 felted Ohfcurity by wroti^ application. Logic k and Dtfpute as much contributed to this. Calling it Subtihty. This Learning very little benefits Society. But defiroys the Inflruments cf Knowledge and Commu- nication.
As ufeful as to confound the Sound of the Letters. This Art has perplexed Re- ligion and Juhice. And ought not topafs for Learning.
Fourthly, Taking them jot Things.
Inftance in Matter, This makes Errors lafling. Fifthly, Setting them for vhat they cannot fignify. y.g. putstng them for the realEjfencet of Sub ft antes.
Hence we think every Change tf our Idea in Sub- Qances, not to change the Species,
The Caufe of this Abufe, a Support ion of Nature's vork- ing always regularly. This Abufe contains twt falje Suppofitions. . Sixthly, A SuppoJttton,thaf Hoards have a certain and evident Signification, The Ends of Language. Firft, To convey our Ideas. Secondly , To do it with Sluicknefs.
Thirdly, Therewith to con- vey the Knowledge #/ Things,
2^-3 1. Mow Mens Words fail in
all thefe.
32. How in Subllancet,
3 3. How in Modes and Relations,
34 Seventhly, Figurative Sketch
alji an Abuje of Language,
CHAP. XI.
of the Remedies of the foregoing Im»
perfeff ions and Abujes, SE GT.
1. They are worth feeking,
2. Are not eafie.
3. But yet nttefary to Philo- fophy.
4. MtfufetflVordt, the Csufe of great Errors.
$. Obftinacy.
6. And Wrangling.
7. Inftance Bat and Bird.
8. Firii, Remedy to ufe n9 Word without an Idea.
9. Secondly, To have diftinff I- deas annexed f them itt Medes.
10. And diftinff and conforma- ble in Subliances.
1 1 . Thirdly, Propriety.
iz. Fourthly , T« make known
their Meaning, 1 5. And that three Ways,
Fir ft, In fimple Ideas by fy-
nonymous Terms or fhewing.
Secondly, In mixed Mtdes by
Definition,
16, Morality capable of Dt- monHration.
17, Definitions can make moral Difcourfes clear.
18, And is the only way. IJ. Thirdly, In Subffancet^ by
fhewing and defining, 20, 21. Ideas of the leading Qua- lities ofSubftancetf are beft g9t bjf Jhtwing^
22.
!+•
I J.
The Contents.
11. The Ideas of their Powers aj. Not eaBe to he made fh.
befi by Definition.
ij. ARefisSion on the Know- ledge of Spirits.
24. Jdeas alfo of Sub fiances muji be conformable to Things,
z6. Fifthly , By Conflancy in their Signification.
zj. When the f^ariation is to be explam'd.
BOOK IV.
CHAP. r.
of Knowledge in general.
SECt.
1. Our Knowledge einverfant about our Ideas.
2. Knowledge is the Perception of the Agreement or Difa- greement of two Ideas.
5. This Agreement four fold. 4. Fir ft , Of Identity or Di-
nierfity. $. Secondly y Relateen,
6. Thirdly, Of Co-exiftence.
7. Fourthly, Of real Exiftence. %. Knowledge aBual tr habi- tual.
p. Habitual Knowledge two^ fold,
C H A P. II.
Of the Degrees of our Knowledge.
SECT.
I, Intuitive.
1, Demonflrative.
3. Depends on Proofs.
4. But not fo eafie,
5. Not without precedent Doubf, • 6. Not fo clear.
7, Each Step muft have intui" tive Evidence,
8, Hence the Miftake ex prs- cegniclSj 6c precooccHie.
9. Demonflration not limited to §luantity. 1 0- 1 J, Why it has been fo thought, 14. Senfitive Knowledge of par- ticular Exiftence. 1 y . Knowledge noi always clear, . where the Liias are Jo.
CHAP. III.
Of the Extent of Human Knowledge. SECT.
I. P/r/?, No farther than ws
have Ideas. X, Secondly, No farther than we can perceive the Agree- ment or Difagreement,
3. Thirdly , Intuitive KnoW' ledge extends it felf not to all the Relations of all our Ideas,
4. Fourthly, Nor demonftrative Knowledge.
5. Fifthly, Senfitive Knowledge narrower than either.
6. Sixthly, Our Knowledge therefore narrower than our Ideas.
7. How far our Knowledge reaches.
%, Firfi, Our Knowledge of /- dentity and Diverfity,as far as our Ideas.
p. Secondly, Of Co-exiftence » very little Way. 10,
The Contents.
10. Btcdufe tJje Ctnnexion be- tvetn m»J}Jimplc Ideas it unknowTi.
1 1 . tffeciallj offecondary Slua- litiet.
! 2- - 1 4. j4nd farther, hecauji all Connexion betvetn any Je- condary and primary Qua- lities is undijcovtrable.
15. Of Repugnancy to co exiS larger,
16. of the Co exiflence of Pow- ers a very little vay.
17. Of the Spirits ytt narrover.
18. thirdly,Of other Relations, tt u not eafe to fay how far. Morality capable of Demon-
firatton. xp. Two Things ban) e made mo- ral Ideas thought uncapabte of DemonfJration. Their Complexednefs, and want of Jcnjible Reprefentations aa. Remedies of thuje Difficulties, iJ. Fourthly, Of real Exijlence, ve have art intuitive Know- ledge of our own, demonflra- tive ofGodsfenftile oj fame few other Things. 2t. O-ir Ignorance great. \l, Firff,Ofie.Caufe of its want ef Ideas, either fuch as we have no Conception of or fuch as particularly we^ have not, 1^. Becaufe of their Remote-
nefs, or, ay. Becauje of their Mtnutenefs, •2.6. Hivce no Science of Bodies* 7. 7. Much left of Spirit f.
18. Secondly, IVant ef a dtfea- virable Connexion between Ideas we have.
19. Iniiaiices.
io Thirdly, IVant of tracing
9ur Ideas. ji. Extent in RffpeS of Uni-
'Vtrfaliry.
CHAP. IV.
Ofjhe Reality of our KwmUdge. SEGT.
1. Object ton. Knowledge pU» ced in Ideas, taay be all bare ri/ton, 2, 3- '^njwer. Not fo, where Ideat ■ agree with Things. . ^. As,Firfl, All fimplt Ideas do, 5. Secondly, AU complex Ideas excepted.
6. Hence the Reality ofmathf mattcal Knowledge.
7, jind of Moral.
S. Exiflence not required to
make tt real. 5, Nor will it be lefs true or certain J becaafe moral Ideas are of our own making and naming.
I o.. Mif- naming diflurbs notice
.. Certainty of the Knowledge.
H. Ideas of Subfiances have ■ their Archetypes without us.
Iz. So far as they agree with thofe, jo far our Knowledge concerning them, ii real.
I J. In our Enquiries about Sub' fiahces, we mufl con/ider /- deas , and not confine our Thoughts to Names orSpecies fuppofit fet out by Names. 14 iJ.ObjeHionagamlf a change-. ' ling being fome thing bet ween' - Man and Beafl, anfwertd,
18. Recapitulation.
CHAP. V.
Of Truth in general. SECT. .
I, What Truth is,
a. An^htjciniieg, »r fe^tror
The Contents.
ting of Signs i u c. Ideas or
Words. a. Which make mental or mer^
bal Propojitions. 4. Mental Propojttions are vt'
ry hard to be treated of. St Being nothing but the join'
ing , or Je^arating Ideas
without W'ords,
6. When mental Propofitiens contain real Truth , and vhen verbal.
7. ObjeEfion againfi verbal Truth, that tt may be thm alchimerical.
8. Anjwered, real Truth is a- bout Ideas agreeing to Things.
Jf. Faljhtod is the joining of
Names otherwifs than their
Ideas agree. JO. General Propo fit ions to be
treated of more at large. II. Moral and metaphyseal
Truth,
CHAP. VI.
of Xfniwrfal Propopionr, their Truth and Certainty.
SECT.
I, Treating of Words ntcejfary
to Knowledge. a. General Truths hardly to ' be under flood, but in verbal Propofitions.
3. Certainty twofold , of Truth, and of Knowledge,
4. No Propofition can be known '' to be true,where the Ejfence
of each Species men tioned^ is not known.
5. This more particularly con* ' cerns Subfiances,
§.. Ths Truth offevt univgrfd
Proportions concerning SuB^ fiances, is to be known. 7, Becaufe CO'Cxiftence of Ideas in few Cafes to be known.
8, 9. Inftance in Gold.
10. As far as any fuchCo exi- ftevce can be known, fo far. univerfal Propofitions may be certain. But this will g» hut a little way, becaufe,
1 1 , 1 z. The §lualities which make. our complex Ideas of Sub* fiances, depend moftly on ex- ternal, remote, and unper* ceived Caufes.
1 3 , Judgment may reach far" ther, but that is not Know^ ledge.
14, What is requi/ite for our Knowledge of Subfiances.
1 s. Whilft our Ideas of Subfiances contain not thiir real Con- fiitutions, we can make but fero general certain Propo- fitions concerning them.
•16. Wherein lies the general Certainty of Propofitions.
CHAP. V 11. 0/ Maxims.
They are felf evident.
Wherein that Self-evidenca
conftfis. Self -evidence not peculiar t»
received Axioms. 4. Firfi , As to Identity and:
Diverfity, all Propofitions
are equally felfevident. $. Secondly, In Co-exiftence we
have few felf evident Pro-
pofitions, 6, Thirdly^ In other Relations
we may have^
SECT I.
a.
3»
The Contents!
7. Fmrthly, C$netrning resl
Exiftence, loe h»vt none. t. Ihefi jixiems do not much influenit tur tther Know- ledge. 9, 10. Becaufe they are not the Truths rhe/irfi known, 11. fVbat Uft tbift general Ma- xims have> \x. Maxims, JfCart he not t»^ km in the life of Words jmay prove ContradtSfions. 1^. Infiance in Vacuum.
1 4. They prove not the Exigence of Things without us.
1 5. Their Application dangerous about complex Ideas.
16-18. Infiance m Man. 19. Ltttle Ufe ofthefe Maxims in Proofs where we have clear and diJitnS Ideas, xo. Their Ufe dangeroM where 9itr Ideas are confufed.
c H A P. V n r
Of trifling Prepofltions,
SECT.
I. Same Propofitious bring no Increafe to our Knowledge, X, 5. As, Firfl , Identical Propo* fitions.
4. Secondly, When a part of any complex Idea itpredtca' ted of the whole.
J. As part of the Definition of the defined.
€. Infiance Man and Palfry.
7. For thu teaches but the Sig- nification of Words.
X. But no real Knowledge.
9. General PropofitioHS con- concerning Subilances , ar$ often trifling, 1 o- And why. ji. Thirdly t UfifgWtrdsVsri*
oufly, ii trifling with thtm. iz. Marks of Verbal Propopti-
•ns. Firfl, Predication in
abftraa. 1^. Secondly, Apart of the De- finition predicated of any
Term,
CHAP. IX.
0/ our Knowledge of Exigence. SECT.
I, General certain Propofiti'
ons eeneern not Extjience. X. A threefold Knowiidge of
Exifttnce. J. Our Knowledge of ottr own Exiflence, it intuitive.
CHAP. X.
Of the Exiftence of a G O.D. SECT.
I, We are capable of knowing certainly, that there it Wr- GOD. X. Man kntwt, that he him- filf «.
3 . He knows alfi, that nothing cannot produce a Being, therefore fomtthmg Eternal.
4. That eternal Being muft be
moH powerful, S- And moH knowing.
6. And therefore G O D,
7. Oitr Idea of a mofl perfeff*'
Being, not the fole Proof of a GO Vf.
8. Something from Eternity,
9. Two forts oj Beings, Cogita- tive and Incogttattve,
10. Incogitattve Being, cannot produce a Cogitative. XI, 12. Therefore there has been an eternal Wifdom,
I J. Whether
The Contents
8.
1 }. Whether nutter ial or no.
l\^. Not material , Firft , Be* caufe every ParticUtf Mat- ter is not cogitative.
Ij, Secondly, One Particle alone of Matter^ cannot be cogi- tative.
\6. Thirdly ^ A Syflem ofinco- gitative Matter, cannot be cogitative,
17. Whether in Motion, or at Reft. 1 8 , 1 p Matter not co-eternal with an eternal Mind^
CHAP. XI.
Of the Knowledge of the Exiilenee of other Things.
SECT.
I. Js to be had only hy Senpt-
® tiOH.
z» Inpance Whiteneft of tbi* Paper.
3. This, tho" not fo certain as Demottfiration, yet may be called Knowledge, and proves the Exigence of Things without us.
4. Firfi , Becaufe we cannot have them but by the Inltt of the Senfes.
5. Becaufe an Idea from affual Senfation, and another from Memory, are very dijlinl} ferceptiont. ^
C. Thirdly^ Pleafure or Pain, which accompanies aBual Senfation, accompanies not the returning of tbofe Ideas without the external Ob- jeifs.
7. Fourthly, Our Senfes ajftjl one another's Tejiimony of the Exiiience of outward Things. Vol. If.
5.
10.
It.
IJ-
I+.
This Certainty is as great as our Condition needs. But reaches no farther thaii allual Senjation. Folly to expeSi Denionflra' tion in every thing. Pafl Exiftencc it known by Memory,
The Exigence of Spirits not knowabte.
Particular Propoftiofh coti' corning Exijlenct, are know- able.
Jnd general Propojtiiont Mncerning abftraSi Ideas.
CHAP. X 11.
Of the improvement of our knowledgi.
SECT.
i. Knowledge is not from MaS
Kims. 3* The Oec^ion ofthatOph
nion. .J. But jrom the Comp&rtUj- dear and diftinB Ideas.
4. Dangerous to build upoft precarious Principles.
5. This no certain way >i Truth,
6. But to compare clear com* pleat Ideas under fieddf Names.
7. The true Method ofadvan, cing Knowledge, u by confi' dering our abfiraB Ideas.
8. By which. Morality alfo may be made clearer.
j>. But Knowledge of Bodies ii to be improved only by Ea- . perience, 10. Thii may procure us Conve^
nience, not Sctemet It. We are fitted for moral Knowledge i and natural Improvement I *
B \%.
The Contents.
11. Buttr.ujl beware of Hypo-
thefes and wrong Principikt.
I J. The true Ufe ejHjpothefes.
1 4. Clear anddtftinEi Jdtas with fe tied Natnes, *nd t be find- ing ofthofe which /hew their Agreement , or Difagree- tncnt, are the ways to en- large our Knowledge.
I/. Slathematicks an InUa^ici of it.
CHAP. XIII.
Some other Confidcrations concerning our Knowledge.
S.E C T.
1 . Our Knowledge partly ne- cejffary, partly voluntary.
2. The Api>licatton 'voluntary ; l>ut we htow as Things art, not as we pleafe.
3. JnJiancW in Sumber,
CHAP. XIV.
0/ Judgment.
SECT.
I. Our Knowledge being Jhort , we wmt frmethiftgelje.
a. M'hat UJe to be madeofthit twilight Estate.
3 . "judgment fupplitt the want of Knowledge.
4. Judgment is the prefntning Things to be fo , without perceiving tt.
CHAP. XV.
of Probability.
Pr(ib.ibijify it the App'-tr^ ance of agreement u^ on fal- lible l' roofs.
SECT.
z. It is ti fuppty the want oj Knowledge.
J. Being that which maiei m freUtme Things to be trut.be- fore we know them tt be ft.
4. The Grounds of Probability are two ; Conformity with our own Experience, or the Teflimony of other Expert' *nce.
5. In this aS the yfgretmentiy pro and con, ought to be examined^ before we time to a JwigVient,
6. They being capable of great yartety.
C H A P. X V I.
Of the Degrees of /ijfent:
SECT.
1. Our Affent ought to bi re- gulated by the Xjrtxnds oj Probability ,
i, Theje caitnot ahdays be aU aihialiy in Vievf, and then we muft content our felves with the Remembrance that we once faw Ground for fuch a Degree of Ajfent,
5, The tU Conjequence of this, if our former Judgment wereyjot rightly made.
4, The right Ufe dfit, is mw
tual Charity and Forbear-
^ ance. '
J . Probability is either of Ma^
terofFaH or Speculation.
6, The concurrent Experience of all other Men with our s^ produces AJfurance approach' ing to Knowledge.
7, Unq'jef tenable TeSimony and Experience fbr themoji part produce Confidence.
%. Fair Tcjlif/itny, arid the Na- ture
10.
II.
12.
n-
14
tare of the thing indiffe- rent , produces alfi cojiji- dint Belief. , Experience and Teflimonies clajbing, infinitely vary the Degrees of Probability, Traditional Tipimoniesy the farther removed, th« lefi their Proof.
Yet Hi/iory is of great Vfe. In things which Senfi can*' not di [cover. Analogy is the great R.ule of Probability. One Cafe where contrary EX' perienne lefftns not the TV- ftimony.
The bare Tefiimony of Re- velation is the highefi Cer* tdinty.
The Contents 14.
CHAP. xvn.
0/ Reafen.
SEGT. I.
of
II
\x
n
Various Significations the Word Reajon. i. Wherein Reafoning confifls.
3, Its four parts.
4. SyHogifm not the great In- Jirument of Reajon,
J. Helps little in Demonftra- tion, lefs in Prebabiltty.
6. Serves not to encreaf oar Knoivledge,but fence with it,
7. Other Helps Jkouid be fought, 8- We ReafoH about Particulars. 9. Firjl, Reafon fails us for
want ofldeaf, 3. Secondly t Becaufe of obfcurt and i7f/perfe£i Ideas. Thirdly, For want of Inter- mediate Ideas, Fourthly, Beeaufe of wrong Principles.
Fifthly, Bteatife of douhf- , fttl Terms.
Our highefi Degree of Know- ledge is intaiti'ue without reafunhig.
IS. The next is Demonfiration by reafoningi
16'. to fttpply :he hfivrowhefs of this, we have nothiv^ but JudgKiJitupoH probableRea- foning.
17. Intuition , Demenfiration, Judgment.
18. Confcque7ices of Words ^ and Confcj'iences of Ideas,
1$, Four ferts of Arguments t Firfly Ad Verecoudiam.
20. Secondly, Ad Ignorantiam,
z I . Thirdly, Ad Haminero.
2Z. Fourthly, Ad Judicium.
zj. Above, contrary, and ac* cording to Reafon.
34. Reafon and Faith not oppt" fits.
CHAP. XVIIJ.
Of Faith and Reafon, and fheir di- fiinU Province}*
SECT.
I. hecejfary to knoit theif
Boundaries, z. Faith and Reafon what, as
contra- diflinguifhed.
3, No new fimple Idea can bs
conveyed by traditional Revelation,
4, Traditional Revelation may
make hs know Propofitiont knowtble a/Jo by iieafoitt but not with the dme Cer- tai?ity that ReaJ$n doth.
5, Rivehttion cannot be ad-
mi tied againjl the deaf Evidence bf Reafon,
6, Tradttionn! ' Revelation much lefs*
f. Things above Rtafoft.
B a «.
The Contents.
8. Or not etntrary to Rtafon,
if rtvenUd, are Matter ef Faith.
9. Revelation , in Matters where Reafon tannot judge^ or hut pr»b ably, ought to be hearknid to.
10, In Matterrohere Reafon can
Afford certain Knowledge that i) to be hearkened to.
11. Iftho Boundaries be not jet
between Faith and Reafon, no Enthtt[iafT», or Extra, n/agancj/ in Religion can be contradified.
CHAP. XIX.
-*• of Enthufiafm.
SECT.
1 . L ovi ef Truth neceffarjt
2. j1 Forvardneft to diffste, whence.
3. Forte of Enthufiafm,
4. Reafon and Revelation.
5. Rife of Enthufiafm, 6, 7, Enthufajm,
8 , <). Enthufiafm miHaktn for fet' ing and feeling. I o. Enthufiafm how to be difco- "jered,
1 1 . Enthufiafm fails of Evi»
dence, that the Propofition is from GOD.
12. Firmnefs of Perfwajion, no
Proiifthat any Propofition
is from GOD. 1 J. Light in the Mind, what, J 4.. Revelation tnufi be judg'd
by Re/ffon, I J. Belief no Proof of Revth*
:ian.
CHAP. XX.
Of wrong Affent, or Error.
SECT.
I. Caufts of Error.
X, Firfi, iVant tf Proofs.
3. Obj IVhat fhall become of thofe who want them^anfwered.
4. People hindered f rim Enquiry. J. Secondly, Want ofjkiL' to ufe
them.
6. Thirdly, Want ofWiU to ufe them.
7. Fourthly, Wrong Meafures of Probability, whereof
%, 10. FtrSl, Ondtful Propofttiom taken for Principles.
1 1 , Secondly, Received Hypethefif.
12. Thirdly, Predominant Paffions. I J, The Means of evading Probo'
bilities, ift. Suppofid Fallacy. 14. zi\y.Suppofed yirgnvjtntjor the contrary.
ly. What Probabilities deter- mine the yiffent,
1 6. Where it is in our Power t» fufpendit.
17. Fourthly, Authority,
18. Men not in fo many Errors as is imagined.
CHAP. XXI.
Divijion of tie Sciences, ,
SECT.
I. Three forts. X, Firjl, Phyfica, J. Secondly, Pra6Jica. Thirdly, ^jd^hotim- f. This is the firfl Divifton of the ObjtHs of Knowledge.
O F
O F
Humane Underftanding. BOOK III.
CHAP. I.
Oj Words or Language tn general.
G
§. I. ^""^ O D having defigned Man for a W'» /'''<' '» (bciable Creature, made him not /'^«» anicuM only with an inclination, and un- '*"^ bounds. der a neceflitv to have tellowihip with thofe of his own kind ^ but furnifhed him alfb with Lan- guage, which was to be the great Inftiument, and common Tye cf Society. Man therefore had by Nature his Organs fo faHiioned, as to be ^t to frame articulate Saunds, which we call Words, But this was not enough to produce Language ; tor Parrots, and (everal other Birds, will be taught to make articu- late Sounds diftinft enough, which yet, by no means, are ca- pable of Language.
§. 2. Befidej articulate Sounds therefore, it was T9 make thevt farther neceffary, that hefliould be abletouje thefe fyvt of Ideii. Sounds, as Signs of internal Conceptions ^ and to make them Itand as marks for the Ideas within his own Mind, where- by they might be made known to others, and the Thoughts o£ Mens Minds be conveyed from one to another.
§. a. But neither was this fufikient to make To make gs-. Words fo ufeful as they ought to be. It is not e- ««''^' •^'^"'• nough for the perfcftion ot Language, that Sounds can oe made Sgns of ideas^ unlefs thole Signs can be ib made uie ©fj as Je coaafrebendfeveral fAtticular Thingj : For the Multiplica-!'
B 5 t4oa
% Worfts or Language in General.
tion of Words would have perplexed their U(c, had every par- riciiiar thing ntcd of a diftinft Name to be fignified by. To re- medy this Inconvenience, Language had yet a farther Improve- ment In the ufe of general Terms, whereby one Word was made to mark a multitude of particular Exiftences : Which ad- vantageous u(c of Sounds was obtain'd only by the Difference of the Idem they were made Signs of Thofe Names becoming general, which^ are made to ftand for general ideat^ and thofe remaining particular, where the ideoi they areufcd tor are par- ticular.
§j 4. Befides thefe Names which ftand for Ideat^
To mahgs- there be other Words which Men make ufe of^
ner^l Signs, not to fignify any Idea^ but the want or abfence ot
fome idcoi fimple or complex^ or all Ideas together ", fuch as are Ntbil in Latin, and in Englilh, Ignorance and Bar- renmfs. All which ntgative or privative Word?, cannot be faid properly ro belong to, or fignify no ideM : for tnen they would be perfe6Vly infignificant Sounds ', but they relate to pofitive Ideaii and iignify their Abferce.
§. 3. It may a]{(> lead us a little towards the O Words ulti- riginal of all our Notions and Knowledge, if wc wntely dtri- ) emark, how great a Dependance our Wordt have wd from fuch on Common {tni\h\€.ldeai \ and how thofe, which fls (ignifj len- are made ufe of to ftand for A6lions and Notions jibU Idea.-. quite removed from ^zn{'Z^h Ave their rife from thence,
and from obviom fenfible Ideas are transferred to more iihflrufc Sigriific^rtionsy and made to ftand for ideds that come aot under the - ogniz ince of our Senfes^ v. g. to Imagine^ Apprehend^ Corf:prche»d, Ad'iere , Conceive , Injiill, Difgufl, DifiurbancCy Tran- ^uillin. Sec. art all Words taken from the Operations of (enfi- bie Tl;'Mgs_> and applied to certain Modes of Thinking. Spirit, in irs primary Signification, is Breath ; Angel, a Meflenger : An 1 I cciiht nor, but if we could trace ihcm to their Sources, * wefliould hnd, in all Languages, the Names, which ftand fof - Thi:^gs •It fill not under our Sfnfes, to have had their firft rife from fenfible Idea;. By which we may give fome kind o£ guef<:, \~ hat kind of Notions they were, and whence derived, whicl' Hllcd theii Minds, who were the Bril Beginners of Lan^ guag;.. j and how Nature, even in the naming of Things, un- aware- r ggefled to Men the Originals and Principles of all theit Knowledge ; Wliilff, to giveN.imes, that might make known to others anv Operations they felt in themfclves, or any other Ideasy that came uat under thcip Senfes^ tbey were lain to. borrow
W'ords.
Words or Language in General, 1
Words from ordinary known lde(i4 of Senfation, by that means to make others the more eafily to conceive thofe Operations they^ experimented in themlelves, which made no outward (enfible Appearances j and then when they had got known and agreed Ndmes, to fignify thofc internal Operations of their own Minds, they were fufficiently furniflied to make known by Word, all their other Ideas ; hnce they could confift of nothing, but ei- ther of outward lenfible Perceptions, or of the inward Opera- tions of their Minds about them; we having, as has been pro- ved, no ideas at all, but what originally come either from ^C:V)r lible Objc6ls without , or what we feel within our felves, from the in vard Workings of our own Spirits, which we are confcious to our felves of within.
§. 6. But to underftand better the ufe and Diflrihutioit^ force of Language, as fublervient to Inllru6lion and Kaovvledgej it will be convenient to conftder,
Firjiy To what it » that Nainesy in the uje of Language^ are imr mediately applied.
Secondly y Since all ('ejfccpt proper ) Names are general, and fo ftand not particularly for this or that fingle Thing; but for (brts and ranks of Things, it will be neceifary to confider, in the next place, what the Sorts and Kinds, or, if you rather like the Latin Names , what the Species and Genera cf Things are j wherein they confift ; and how they come to be made. Thefe being ( as they ought ) well looked into, we (hall the better come to find the right ufe of Words ; the natural Advantages and Defe6h of Language ; and the Remedies that ought to be ufed, to avoid the inconveniencies of obicurity^ or uncertainty in the fignification of Words, without which, it is irapcfiSble to difeourfe with any elearnefs, or order, concerning. Know- ledge : Which being converfant about Propoiitians, and thofe moft commonly univerQ ones, has greater connexion wkb Words, than perhaps is fufpedted.
Thcfe Conhderations therefore, Ihall be the matter of tba Following Chapters..
B 4 € M A E
The Signification of Wor^s.
CHAR If.
Of the S'tgntficAtion of Words,
Words art §• I. X yC A N, though he have great variety ftnfihU sigm IVl of Thoughts, and fuch, from which
Kicepry for -*- X others, as well as himfelf, might re-
Conmumca- ceivre Profit and Delight \ yet they are all with- "^' in his own Breaft, invlfible, and hidden from o«
thers, nor can of themfelves be made appear. The Comfort, and Advantage of Society, not being to bchad with- out Cominunicaiion of Thoughts, it was neceifary, that Man Ihoi'ld find our fome external lenfible Signs, whereby thofein- vifiblc Jc/fu/, whtLh his Thoughts are made up of, might be made xnr.wn CO orhcr?^ For this purpole, nothing was lo fit, either for Plenty ov Qujcknefs, as thofe articulate Sounds, which with fo much Eafe and Variety, he found himfelf able to make. .Thus we may conceive how PVords, which were by Nature fo "Well adapted to that purpofe, come to be made ule of by Men, as tU^ Sifns of their ideoi ; not by any natural connexion, that there is between particular articulate Sounds and certain Ideas, for then there would be b-Jt one Language amongft all Men ; but by a voluntary Impofition, whereby fiich a Word is made arbitrarily the Mark of luch an Idea, The ufe then oi Words, is